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Abstract
This note gives an easily veriﬁed necessary and suﬃcient condition
for one probability forecaster to empirically outperform another
one in terms of all strictly proper scoring rules.
Keywords: probability forecasts, scoring rules, reﬁnement.
1 The problem and notation
Probability forecasting has a long and distinguished history in meteorology and
medicine. Due to the increasing importance of default predictions in the credit
industry, it has recently become important also in economics, so the subsequent
discussion is couched in terms of default probabilities for corporate bonds.
Let 0 = a1 < a2 < ::: < ak = 1 be k predicted probabilities of default.
We circumvent the problem of converting conventional letter grades such as
1Research supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft under SFB 475
1AAA into predicted probabilities of default by equating the latter to historical
default frequencies below. This note is not concerned with the intricacies of
correctly mapping letter grades probabilities of default, but with assessing the
empirical performance of competing rating agencies.
Let q(ai) be the relative frequency with which default probability forecast ai
is made and let p(ai) be the conditional relative frequency of default given
probability forecast ai. Given two rating agencies A and B who rate the same
n borrowers, with frequency functions qA(ai);qB(ai);pA(ai) and pB(ai), it is
then natural to ask whose forecasts have been better? Below it is shown that,
in a sense, an unequivocal answer is possible if and only if A and B can be
ranked according to the ”empirical reﬁnement ordering”. Otherwise, there will
always exist two strictly proper scoring rules such that one prefers A to B and
the other prefers B to A.
2 The empirical reﬁnement ordering
DeGroot and Fienberg (1983) introduce the reﬁnement ordering among well
calibrated probability forecasters. A probability forecaster is called well cali-
brated if, among borrowers with predicted default probability ai, the long-run
relative percentage of defaults is equal to ai:
ai = p(ai): (2.1)
A well calibrated forecaster A is called ”more reﬁned” than B, in symbols:
A ¸R B, if there exists a k£k Markov matrix M (i.c. a matrix with nonnegative













A(aj) (i = 1;:::;k): (2.3)
Equation (2.2) means that, given A’s forecast aj, an additional independent
randomisation is applied according to the conditional distribution Mij (j =
1;:::;k) which produces forecasts with the same probability function as that of
B. Condition (2.3) ensures that the resulting forecast is again well calibrated.
Below, calibration is ensured by equating observed default rates to predicted
ones. A forecaster who then dominates another one in the reﬁnement sense is
called ”empirically more reﬁned”.
The crucial point for the subsequent discussion, ﬁrst observed by DeGroot and
Eriksson (1985), is that A ¸R B is equivalent to the fact that the distribution
qA(ai) second-order stochastically dominates the distribution qB(ai). This al-
lows to tap the vast literature on necessary and suﬃcient conditions for second
order stochastic domination. In particular, we can use a theorem dating back










for all continuous, convex functions g on the unit interval. This key inequality
is now related to scalar measures of forecasting performance known as scoring
rules.
3 Strictly proper scoring rules
Let µi(i = 1;:::;n) be an indicator variable taking the value 1 if borrower i
defaults and 0 otherwise, and let Pi 2 fa1;:::;akg be the default probability
3attached to borrower i. A scoring rule is a function F(µ1;:::;µn;p1;:::;pn)















`n(jpi + µi ¡ 1j) (3.6)
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(3.7)
(see e.g. Winkler 1996). A scoring rule can also be viewed as a random variable
which takes a value S1(p) if the forecaster reports a predicted probability p for
the event in question and the event actually occurs, and which takes a value
S2(p) if the event in question does not occur. For the Brier-score, we have
S1(p) = ¡(p¡1)2 and S2(p) = ¡p2. A scoring rule is called ”strictly proper” if
its expectation, given the subjective probability distribution of the forecaster,
is maximized if and only if the probability forecasts are equal to the subjective
probabilities. All scoring rules above are strictly proper.
A key result about proper scoring rules, due to Savage (1971), states that a
scoring rule is strictly proper if and only if the subjectively expected score for
a forecaster who reports his true subjective probabilities, viewed as a function
of p, is a strictly convex function. For the Brier-score, for instance, we have
E[B(p)] = ¡[p(p ¡ 1)
2 + p
2(1 ¡ p)] = ¡[p(1 ¡ p)]: (3.8)
4Also, any strictly convex function on the unit interval induces a strictly proper
scoring rule via
S1(p) = E[S(p)] + (1 ¡ p)dE[S(p)]=dp (3.9)
and
S2(p) = E[S(p)] ¡ pdE[S(p)]=dp (3.10)
(see Winkler 1996, section 3).
In the credit rating context, default probabilities are often equated to ob-
served default frequencies. For this to make sense, the sample has to be quite
large, of course. Then it is natural to evaluate scoring rules by attaching to
borrower i the observed frequency of the grade borrower i has been sorted into.
THEOREM: If predicted default probabilities are equal to observed
default rates, then forecaster A outperforms forecaster B according to all
strictly proper scoring rules if and only if A is empirically more reﬁned than B.
PROOF: The key to the proof of the theorem is to show that all empiri-
cally computed proper scoring rules, which are initially deﬁned as functions
of µ1;:::;µn and p1;:::;pn, depend on these inputs only via a1;:::;ak and
some strictly convex function g. To see this, note that pi is by deﬁnition equal
to the empirical default rate of grade aj 2 fa1;:::;akg which has been as-
signed to borrower i. Then the forecaster is by deﬁnition well calibrated, and
a percentage q(aj) of the predicted p’s are equal to aj. For these p’s and the
corresponding µ’s, the observed score is equal to the expected score, computed





q(aj)[ajS1(aj) + (1 ¡ aj)S2(aj)]; (3.11)
where
g(a) := aS1(a) + (1 ¡ a)S2(a) (3.12)
is a strictly convex function in view of Savage (1971). The assertion of the
theorem then immediately follows from (2.4).
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